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Complex increasing the security level is 
currently one of the most important tasks which the 
whole society, the governments of individual states 
but also the management of every firm is faced 
with. At the same time to achieve safe life and 
sustainable improvement of the standard of living 
is the objective of all people. The security has 
ceased to be interpreted as a state of preparedness 
for averting a possible military attack, but it is 
perceived as an ability to ensure continuous 
development of the society and to fulfil the 
society-wide goals. The protection of the selected 
most important elements of the infrastructure 
which has a principal influence on a problem-free 
operation of the society and achieving the required 
standard of living of the citizens is an important 
part of these activities. This part of the 
infrastructure designated as critical is a condition 
for fulfilling the basic economic, social and 
political functions of the state. 
The critical infrastructure represented especially 
by the sector of telecommunications, power 
industry, transport but also the food industry, 
health care through it essence fulfils the basic tasks 
of the modern state. If any of these vitally 
important areas fails, the collapse can spread to 
other sectors because they are mutually linked and 
dependent on each other. In the current world 
which is very closely linked by the information, 
telecommunication, transportation and other 
networks, it is very probable that serious failures or 
breakdowns will cause damages not only in the 
state where they arise but very probably also in 
others, not only the neighbouring countries. The 
critical infrastructure protection became therefore a 
global challenge which is to be approached 
unambiguously from the multination point of view. 
 
1. SECURITY OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The system approach to ensuring the required 
level of security and sustainable development  of 
the society represents ensuring the security and 
sustainable development of the human society 
elements (states, nations, institutions of the public 
administration, the elements of the critical 
infrastructure, legal entities, groups of persons as 
well as individuals who create the system) and on 
the other hand ensuring the security of the links 
and information flows between the elements of the 
system which can be dominant for the situation of 
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the human society (the legal environment, social 
environment and relations, interpersonal 
relations,…).  
 
Improving the level of security of the process 
for fulfilling the stated goals belongs to the basic 
tasks of the leading employees on all levels of the 
state administration, territorial self-government, 
the managers of the entrepreneurial subjects in 
manufacturing and services as well as the 
representatives of various associations and 
organisations aimed at the public inspection. They 
achieve it through identifying the risks in any area 
of the human activity including the risks 
threatening the operability of the critical 
infrastructure, their complex analysing and 
assessment in all society life areas and through 
searching for way of their reduction. The process 
of assessing and managing risks in the conditions 
of the critical infrastructure has to be permanent; it 
has to run continuously and to create conditions for 
continuous improvement of the activity results of 
the relevant subjects. The area of the critical 
infrastructure’s security and risk which endanger it 
is mutually interconnected and it is to be 
understood in a complex way. That is why it is 
inevitable to investigate the security environment, 
to assess concrete risk and actual threats and to 
optimise the processes of their permanent 
reduction. 
Generally, the term security designates an 
objective state defined by the environment, 
conditions, elements and their relations in which 
the given subject does not feel threatened. The 
term security is defined in a whole range of 
scientific works, legal standards as well as various 
popular materials in different ways. In the 
terminological dictionary of the crisis management 
the term security is defined as follows: 
The security is a state of the social, natural, 
technical, technological system or another system 
which in concrete internal and external conditions 
enables fulfilling the stated functions and their 
development in the interest of people and the 
society. 
The security has its internal as well as external 
dimension. The internal security expresses a state 
of security of those elements and relations which 
are inside of the given system against the external 
security. It is also based on the interpretation of he 
subject’s state and the ability to reduce the risks 
which can be a source of threats. Its protection also 
consists in the preparedness and ability of the 
system to be activated due to reducing the 
probability of the rise of a crisis phenomenon 
which would threaten the fulfilment of the stated 
goals and its development. 
The external security is based on the level and 
character of the elements and relations of the 
external threat and parallely on the influence of 
various protection elements of the social life 
(military, political, economic,…). Its protection 
consists also in the preparedness and ability of the 
system to perform against other subjects which 
affect its security and in the qualities of its 
elements as well as collaborating subjects being 
able to participate in achieving the required level 
of security (determinateness, properties and 
possibilities to create various security sub-systems 
or institutions). 
The structured character of the security is 
shown from the point of view of the extent in its 
vertical hierachisation (it is derived from the 
system of governing a territory, from the global 
viewpoint up to the individual citizen) and from its 
horizontal classification (its basis is in the 
professional division of the human activities). The 
vertical structure of security contains a whole 
range of the security levels whose importance is 
not derived only from the size of the territorial or 
organisational unit which it expresses but also 
from the angle of view of the subject assessing the 
situation. 
On the other hand the horizontal division of 
security is connected with individual areas of the 
human activity but also with the environment 
people realise their activities. The optimal 
development of the state is impossible without 
achieving a certain level of the political, military 
but also economic, information, technical and 
technological as well as energy security. A 
substantial part of the segments of the horizontal 
division of security belongs to individual sectors of 
the critical infrastructure. 
 
2. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 
INFLUENCE ON CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
In the process of assessing the security level of 
any system, equipment, process or activity it is 
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inevitable to define correctly its security 
environment. The complex and objective 
assessment of the security environment enable to 
take optimal measures for maintaining or 
improving the security level and the sustainable 
development of the society. To know the security 
environment on one hand and the possibilities of 
the state on the other hand enable correct heading 
of the security policy. 
Defining the term security environment is not 
univocal. Similarly as the security also the security 
environment has its complicated vertical and 
horizontal structure. The security environment 
performs on one hand in the framework of the 
global environment, the environment of the 
international organisations or states and on the 
other hand in the framework of various systems 
creating the society structure and fulfilling their 
basic functions which are interconnected by mutual 
links and activities in the area of security. 
The security environment is thus a space where 
the security is realised, in which it has developed 
and is developing otherwise a threat for the 
security, interests, activities, values of the 
international society, a concrete state, various 
forms of the social groupings, legal entities or 
individual citizens arises. However, this part of the 
security environment mostly performs as a 
condition for changes in the security of individual 
systems, in a smaller extent as their cause. The 
security environment is at the same time created by 
the qualitative and quantitative parameters (factors, 
indicators), the characteristics of the system itself 
whose relation change to each other as well as in 
relation to the conditions is as a rule the basic 
cause of the security changes as a state and the 
change of perception and experiencing the 
security. 
For the needs of investigating the processes 
connected with the critical infrastructure protection 
the security environment can be defined as 
follows: 
The security environment is a changeable 
complex of the external and internal conditions, 
factors, relations and activities which determine 
the changes of the state of security and whose 
perception, knowledge and experiencing finds its 
expression in the behaviour of the social subjects. 
The security environment has always a concrete 
character. In spite of frequent repeatability or 
similarity it performs and changes in concrete 
geographical, territorial, time, demographic and 
historical conditions which take a form of real 
socio-economic, political, military, cultural and 
other determinants of the security. At the same 
time these determinants are enforced in 
confrontation with concrete social subjects which 
more or less affect the security environment. 
The security environment can be classified 
according to several criteria. One of them is the 
placement of the element which affects the security 
level. When defining the internal and external 
security environment we assume that the 
environment is not a complex of mutually acting 
factors, influences and elements beyond the 
boundaries of the given system but simultaneously 
also a complex of factors, elements and influences 
which are part of the given system or perform 
inside of it. The involvement of a concrete element 
to the external or internal security environment is 
relative; it is dependent on the system extent into 
which we involve it. 
The internal security environment relates to 
detecting the internal security and order in the state 
(protection against criminality and organised 
crime,…). The term internal security which is 
represented by the internal security environment 
has been recently connected with the term social 
vulnerability (it concerns especially the most 
advanced and richest cities with high concentration 
of inhabitants and people become an easy target of 
the violent criminal activity).  However, it is also 
connected with the protection against natural 
disasters whose sources are in individual regions 
different and for which the institutions of the 
public administration do not expend the same 
resources. The internal security environment is 
also dependent on the structure of industry, on the 
prevention of industrial accidents and on the 
technical and technological maturity of the country 
and its citizens. 
The external security environment relates to 
detecting the external security and defence of the 
state (protection against military threats by other 
states or military coalitions). Except for this it is 
affected by the character of the external threats 
including natural disasters and global disruption of 
the environment. The external security 
environment is based on the ability of the subject 
to influence other subjects in the effort to maintain 
the required security level. 
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The trends of the internal security and possible 
scenarios of reactions to these trends 
unambiguously show that the society strives in a 
greater extent to build complex security systems 
based on the exchange of information on the global 
scale. The information society is endangered by a 
whole range of risks and its vulnerability has a 
quality changed in a fundamental way. The 
security is thus more and more dependent on the 
data accessibility and failure-free function of the 
communication system and technologies. The 
unsolved problems in this area can result in the rise 
of extensive crisis phenomena whose negative 
impacts can by their extent resemble the crisis of 
the military character. 
The internal security of the modern society 
cannot be defined from the position of the national 
or even regional or sector security and it cannot be 
created like this. The internal security has to be 
substantiated by the global framework conditions 
and control tools. The never ending changes of the 
security threats and consequences require imple-
menting new methods of identification, e.g. model-
ling and simulation. At the same time we have to 
develop new legitimate procedures how to respond 
to the security threats, long-term management, 
warning, adaptation and acceptation. 
The required level of the internal security is not 
only the task of the state. The economy and 
especially sectors and subjects operating the 
critical infrastructure have their responsibility. And 
finally, the level of the internal security is 
determined by the responsibility of every citizen – 
both on the level of capability and will to protect 
our own persons but also on the level of helping 
the others. It requires a change of approach to the 
danger and risk. Only if the society understands the 
necessity of the collective security, the citizens will 
be willing to adopt the limitations in the crisis 
situations. [18]. 
The security environment is also classified ac-
cording to the extent, importance and distance of 
the events which have a direct impact on the secu-
rity situation of the territory assessed. Every emer-
gency as well as actual risks and real threats have 
their territorial and dynamic side which affect the 
development of the security environment of the 
given state or region. In compliance with these 
facts the external security environment can be de-
fined as immediate, close and remote security envi-
ronment.  
The immediate security environment includes 
the neighbouring states or regional integration 
groupings. The natural but also industrial accidents 
which have supranational character (e.g. the con-
sequences of disaster in nuclear facilities) possess 
here a specific place. The development of the secu-
rity environment is up to a certain level affected by 
the quality of the relations between states and the 
foreign policy of the state but also the level of the 
internal security environment of the neighbouring 
country.  
The close security environment includes the Eu-
ropean region (the EU states but also other coun-
tries on the European continent as well as various 
types of political, economic or military groupings, 
e.g. EEC, NATO and others). The influences of the 
natural and industrial disasters play an important 
role also on this level. The development of the se-
curity environment level is influenceable only in a 
limited extent, in dependence on the character and 
importance of the concrete risks and threats.  
The remote security environment contains the 
main areas of interest of the world and European 
powers (e.g. influencing the security environment 
in the area of mining strategic raw materials, etc.). 
In this area it is inevitable to assess the global 
climatic changes and their effect of the society or 
also the global effects of the nuclear disasters. The 
development of the security environment on this 
level can be affected only minimally. It is carries 
out in the form of international negotiations on the 
ground of international organisations, e.g. the UN.  
(Zeman, 2003) 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The security environment of each reference 
subject consists of a whole range of elements. A 
part of them creates the internal security environ-
ment and another one represents the external secu-
rity environment. The fulfilment of the security in-
terests of the reference objects requires formulating 
and implementing specific strategies and policy. 
However, it is impossible without complex 
knowledge of the security environment which 
permanently develops and changes.  
The analysis of the security environment is a 
process of defining the basic interests and activities 
of the reference object and identifying the risks and 
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threats which can disrupt their security and 
fulfilment of the planned goals. Subsequently it is 
inevitable to state also the most appropriate 
measures for their reduction or complete removal.  
 
The interests resulting from the protection of 
the most important values of the reference object 
are divided into vital and important interests ac-
cording to the Security Strategy of the Slovak Re-
public from 2001. Except for this, in several pro-
fessional studies and also in the Security Strategy 
of the Czech Republic the term “further interests” 
or “long-term interests” are introduced. If we take 
into account just this classification the extent of the 
interests which are to be protected is very exten-
sive. According to one part of experts it is neces-
sary to consider the threats for security those ones 
which have an existential character for the refer-
ence object, it means they are vital threats and also 
the general public perceives them in this way. The 
security in this context is exclusively understood as 
certainty of maintaining the existence.  
The measures for reducing the assessed security 
threats have the goal to minimise the risk, i.e. to 
reduce the probability of the rise of negative 
phenomena disrupting the security and to reduce 
the size of the damages which could arouse the 
possible rise of them as well as the means used for 
minimising this risk and damages. These measures 
become part of the security policies and strategies. 
They are used for materialising the threat and 
become part of the security environment. 
The internal security environment contains also 
undesirable components which represent especial-
ly: 
 the structural threats which result from the 
existence of the reference object itself, 
 the current threats which arise due to a 
common or non-scheduled performance of 
the reference object. 
 
The security analysis is carried out in the 
environment of uncertainty which is given by the 
dynamics of the security environment and 
complexity of the security systems of individual 
reference objects as well as their environment. The 
objective of the security environment analysis is to 
acquire material for the political process whose 
goal is to achieve the required security level.  
The object of the analysis is assessed in the 
conditions of subjective uncertainty which means 
that there is lack of information about the 
phenomenon investigated. This type of uncertainty 
is connected with the rate of knowledge of the 
competent employees. The subjective uncertainty 
cannot be fully removed because it is almost never 
possible to acquire relevant information for the 
given reference framework. However, on the other 
hand we have to speak also about the objective 
uncertainty. It results from the facts that the 
security analysis is aimed at phenomena which 
objectively still do not exist. The total removal of 
uncertainty is impossible in spite of the fact that 
effective strategies are able to minimise the 
uncertainty or to transform it to the risk.  
In the security environment analysis the 
uncertainty is linked with the level of the risk and 
here the risk represents the probability rate of the 
threat materialisation. On the other hand it is 
inevitable to assess not only the probability of the 
rise but also the quantitative extent of the given 
negative phenomenon. From the point of view of  
assessing the security environment in relation to 
the protection of the critical infrastructure is thus 
necessary to state not only the probability of the 
rise of an non-scheduled phenomenon but also the 
extent of the negative impacts on the society.  
During the analysis of the security environment 
we create a model approximately corresponding 
with reality according to which it subsequently 
possible to formulate the security policies and 
strategies. The effort is to capture and describe the 
reality as complexly as possible, i.e. to describe 
those elements, links and processes in the security 
environment which affect it most distinctively or 
have a potential to affect the reference object in the 
future. The analysis of the security environment 
usually consists of two key parts – the description 
of the actual situation and the prognosis of the 
security environment in the future. 
The task of the description is the primary 
illustration of the security situation, i.e. the current 
state of the security environment. It can also 
comprise historical facts which clarify the current 
situation and can help formulating the 
generalisation and theses about the development in 
the future. The description unusually includes the 
qualitative assessment and the most important 
thing is to pay attention to the relevant information 
about the elements and links. However, no 
 Protection of Critical Infrastructure  Logistics and Transport No 1(14)/2012 
 
 86 
description can reproduce the security environment 
in its whole complexity. The social analyses in 
general catch only those elements of the real 
environment which can be caught and described by 
common communication means or through verbal 
and statistical descriptions. 
When prognosing the future development we 
distinguish the linear forecasts (one cause arouses 
one reaction or subsequently one resulting 
phenomenon), the divergent forecasts (one cause 
arouses several reactions which lead to several 
resulting phenomena) and the convergent forecasts 
(several causes performs in a cumulative way and 
arouses one resulting phenomenon) which enable 
to foresee the development of the future actions 
and processes. (DeRosnay, 1979). Prognosing is 
the second phase of the complex analysis of the 
security environment. In its framework it is 
important to single out the rational players in the 
security environment, i.e. first of all other players 
of the international relations and relevant 
subsystems of the reference object and on the other 
hand the natural forces performing in an irrational 
way with a reduced possibility of forecasting. 
When estimating the future development we can 
forecast and complexly describe the phenomena 
and processes connected with the natural forces 
only with difficulties, however, we can anticipate 
them. Also the sources of the industrial accidents 
with the impacts on the assessed environment and 
combinations of the natural forces with effects of 
the industrial accidents of great extent can 
irrationally perform in a similar way.  
The methods of analysing the security 
environment are the same as the risk assessment of 
the territorial units. One of the basic qualitative 
methods which enable to work out the 
development of the future actions and processes is 
the method of creating scenarios. It is utilised by 
the bodies of the public administration for 
assessing the internal security environment but also 
when forecasting the international events. This 
method enables to optimise gradually the 
development of the actions and processes and 
subsequently the individual scenarios. Its is also 
suitable to reduce the rate of subjectivism by using 
the methods that are based on the team knowledge 
of a wider security community.  
An important issue in the process of assessing 
the security environment is to define the risks and 
threats. Several methods that are based on the 
quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative tools 
and materials are used for these activities. The 
quantitative procedures are based on real 
quantifiable inputs which are results of statistical 
investigations. On the other hand the semi-
quantitative and qualitative inputs are based 
especially on the expert estimation. The semi-
quantitative procedures require data which is 
estimated and subsequently structured into 
intervals. The qualified estimations which are most 
frequently utilised in the framework of the security 
environment analysis can be transformed through 
semi-quantitative procedures and can be expressed 
in a more exact way.  
The biggest shortages of any analysis are the 
credibility and ability to describe the followed 
phenomenon in a real way. In the case of the 
analysis dealing with security and development, 
this problem is emphasised by the great extent and 
by the work carried out in this area until now. In 
the security studies there is only one single clear 
turning line which represented by the end 
bipolarity, however, the discipline is internally 
divided due to an unclear object of investigation 
and the starting point of the individual procedures. 
These facts cause that to set up an exhausting 
overview of the theories dealing with the impact of 
the security problems on the development of the 
individual components and branches of the society 
and the development of increasing or decreasing 
the security rate is extraordinarily difficult. This is 
also decisively important e.g. for investigating 
terrorism which represents a multidimensional 
threat. This fact arouses the opportunities to realise 
the analyses through various types of theories – 
from the psychological, sociological, geopolitical 
and mathematical up to the economic ones. 
 
4. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
The security environment of individual 
countries differs from each other in dependence on 
the position of the given country in the 
international system and also on the extent and 
level how the individual security sectors are built. 
When analysing the security environment it is 
inevitable to take into account the geographical 
position of the reference object, i.e. the concrete 
state or region.  
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In the case of the Slovak Republic the 
geographical factors are the main determinant of 
the security environment development because just 
they distinguish it largely from the actual providers 
of the key analyses of the security environment, 
e.g. the EU or NATO. In the conditions of 
Slovakia the security environment analysis is often 
taken over from international institutions or other 
internationally and politically important countries. 
The reason is moreover the size and position of the 
country in the international environment but also a 
feeling of false subsidiarity.  
For these reasons but also for other political 
grounds, e.g. maintaining sovereignty and moral 
integrity, it is necessary to create our own security 
environment analyses which should be based on 
the specific position of the Slovak Republic 
compared with the average of the EU and NATO 
countries, but connected to the global development 
and important regional as well as global trends.  
The security environment is in Slovakia 
assessed in the process or during alteration of the 
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic. Last time 
this process was realised in 2005. Except for this, 
every year we work out and on the level of the 
central bodies of the state administration the 
Report about Security of the Slovak Republic is 
discussed. The Report about Security of the Slovak 
Republic for 2010 was worked out on the basis of 
the provision § 2, letter a), section 3 of the law No. 
110/2004 Coll., about performing the Security 
Council of the Slovak Republic in the time of 
peace according to which the Security Council of 
the Slovak Republic assesses and once a year 
submits to the government of the Slovak Republic 
the report with proposals of measures. The report 
was worked out by an interdepartmental working 
group under the gestion of the chairman of the 
Security Council of the Slovak Republic according 
to the Methodology for Working out Reports about 
Security of the Slovak Republic approved by the 
resolution of the Security Council of the Slovak 
Republic No. 238 from 26
th
 November 2008. 
The report was based on materials which were 
worked out and submitted by the relevant 
ministries, other central bodies of the state 
administration, state bodies as well as the security 
councils of the regional offices in the seat of the 
region according to the approved content structure 
of the material. The external and internal aspects of 
the security situation are the content of it. It briefly 
assesses the security level of the Slovak Republic 
and the realisation of its security interests. It shows 
the main shortages which can negatively affect the 
security of the citizen and state. The main priority 
of the activities of the ministries, other central 
bodies of the state administration and the bodies of 
the local state administration in the issues of 
security became the realisation of the tasks 
resulting from the elaboration of the Policy 
Statement of the Government of the Slovak 
Republic to their concrete conditions.  
The government of the Slovak Republic has 
declared it will constantly pay attention to ensuring 
security of Slovakia. The Security Council of the 
Slovak Republic as the advisory body of the 
Slovak government coordinated together with the 
ministries, other central bodies of the state 
administration and other state bodies the 
preparation of the documents solving the state 
security. The submitted report shows the security 
of the Slovak Republic has been ensured. The 
methods of coping with problems and risks are 
expressed continuously in the whole material and 
in the proposals of measures. Such a regular 
objective assessment ensures not only a permanent 
overview about the state of security, but if 
necessary, it enables also early correction of the 
goals and tasks of the security policy from the 
level of the Slovak government with impacts on 
improving the security system of the Slovak 
Republic. The final part suggests the measures for 
improving the state of security in the Slovak 
Republic in the further time period.  
Slovakia works out the analyses of the security 
environment especially for the needs of the central 
bodies of the state administration which belong to 
the supranational and international structures and 
concentrate on the regional security level and do 
not reflect the specific local conditions. The 
regional security level should take an important, 
however, not the absolute part of the attention of 
the country’s security community. This fact results 
from the following basic assumptions: 
 the immediate geographical surroundings of 
the Slovak Republic includes several latent 
threats, especially the eastern frontier with 
Ukraine, 
 also threats of the global character where 
belong the economic crises but also the 
threats from cyber space, cyber terrorism 
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and terrorism in general are a reference 
framework of the Slovakia’s security.  
 
The basic step of analysing the security 
environment is its primary description. The actual 
risks and threats are identified in its framework. 
The description can be based on the historical facts 
which explain the actual situation and can 
participate in generalising the materials for 
prognosing the future development. It means it has 
a form of a qualitative assessment which is based 
on relevant information about the elements and 
links occurring in the assessed environment. 
However, the description of the security 
environment has only a limited utilisation and 
means only the orientation inside the problem and 
the preparation of a part of materials for usage in 
the framework of more exact procedures.  
According to the current security strategy the 
security environment of the Slovak Republic is 
characterised and parallely affected by the 
following facts: 
 the Slovak Republic is geographically and 
by its historical, cultural, political, economic  
and other linkages part of the Euro-Atlantic 
space, 
 by its membership in the UN, OSCE and 
other organisations  and groupings the 
Slovak Republic actively contributes to the 
effort of the international commonwealth to 
maintain the peace  and security in the 
world, 
 by accession to NATO the Slovak Republic 
became part of the system of collective 
defence and security, 
 by accession to the EU the Slovak Republic 
acquired guarantees of the political and 
economic stability, 
  entering the OSCE the Slovak Republic 
became integrated to the economically most 
advanced countries of the world, 
 the geopolitical position of the Slovak 
Republic in Central Europe determines the 
security policy of the Slovak Republic, 
 the membership of the Slovak Republic in 
the international organisations changed its 
security position in a principal way and 
created new conditions for realising its 
security interests. (Bezpečnostná stratégia, 
2005)  
 
The security environment of Slovakia is 
affected by the external and internal threats. 
According to the type and character of the threat 
some of them perform together from the external 
as well as internal environment. They often overlap 
and affect each other and it is impossible to 
separate them. The correct assessment of 
information acquired about the external and 
internal threats is a very important element for 
adopting a suitable set of measures for improving 
the state security. That is why this area is currently 
paid increased attention. 
The external parameters which impact the 
security environment of the country are 
substantially affected by the global changes and 
trends which Slovakia is not always able to 
influence. We fail to remover the traditional global 
problems as poverty, lack of foodstuffs, possible 
pandemics or the danger of the world war, etc. and 
parallely the political potential of the new 
substantial global problems arises, e.g. the issue of 
climatic changes and accessibility and utilisation of 
the raw material sources. Currently the weakening 
of influence on the political and economic affairs 
of the traditional power centres (including the EU) 
goes on continuously. On the regional as well as 
the global level the influence of the so called new 
powers – e.g. China, Turkey, Iran, India and Brazil 
increases and the destabilisation of some 
strategically important countries, e.g. Pakistan 
deepens. The consequences of the global economic 
crisis – reduction of funds, increasing prices of 
foodstuffs and growing social frustration resulting 
from the high unemployment rate create 
assumptions for political changes in several Arabic 
countries, including the states in the north of 
Africa. The ethnical and religious unrests persist in 
a lot of regions in the world and procuring of 
military capacities with unpredictable 
consequences for the international stability 
continues.  
The threat of the conventional military attack 
against the Slovak Republic is low; the non-
military, asymmetric threats are more probable. 
The trends of stagnation of the illegal immigrants 
moving across the Slovak territory are confirmed, 
however, the effort of migrants to acquire a legal 
entrance to the Slovak territory increases. The 
threat of criminal activity of the illegal migrants 
persists. The risks connected with the activities of 
the organised crime and demonstrations of 
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radicalism and extremism are on a comparable 
level as in the previous time period. Disrupting the 
deliveries of strategic raw materials, illegal 
proliferation of weapons including those of the 
mass destruction and materials for their 
construction and the information war including the 
misuse of the cyber space and social networks still 
belongs to the threats for the Slovak Republic. 
Until now no immediate terrorist threat or 
involvement of people to preparation of a terrorist 
attack abroad has been recorded in the Slovak 
territory. 
A new phenomenon of the current period is the 
impact of the financial and economic crisis on the 
EU. The last events in Europe concerning the 
solution of the debt crisis have caused falls of the 
governments in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
Greece, Slovenia, but also in Slovakia. The further 
development in this area is unpredictable and it is 
confirmed by the opinions of the foremost 
European politicians. Though Germany and France 
exert enormous effort to maintain the eurozone, if 
it goes bankrupt, the existence of the EU itself is 
threatened and this fact would bring serious 
economic consequences. The European leaders 
have to realise the extent of the crisis which can 
lead to unpredictable situations. In spite of the 
political peace in Europe, the financial and 
economic crisis can cause serious existential 
problems especially in the smaller EU countries. In 
general the following risks and threats can 
endanger the security environment in Slovakia in 
the nearest future: 
 the terrorism represents for Slovakia a 
strategic global risk, 
 the war conflicts whose source can be the 
regional conflicts and subsequences of some 
activities of the important player in the 
international politics threatening the stability 
of the international law system,  
 the global financial, debt and economic 
crisis, 
 the inadequate armament,  
 the proliferation of the weapons of mass 
destruction and some dangerous 
technologies, 
 the international organised crime, 
 the radical nationalism and extremism – 
disrupting the stability of the social and 
political system of the Slovak Republic as 
well as its international position, 
 the illegal and uncontrolled migration, 
 the activities of the foreign intelligent 
services can perform against the interests of 
the Slovak republic as well as its citizens 
outside the territory of the country, 
 the cyber attacks against the information and 
communication systems, 
 the countries which fail, poverty and 
economic imbalance,  
 the negative impacts of globalisation, 
 the unequal political, economic, social and 
cultural development, 
 spreading of pandemics, epidemics and 
dangerous contagious diseases as well as 
contagions of animals threatening the health 
of inhabitants and animals, 
 the raw material and energy dependence on 
the vitally important resources, 
 the climatic changes, 
 the ecological changes, 
 the natural and technological disasters with 
the cross-border impact and impact 
exceeding the regional boundaries,… 
 
The aforementioned threats have an impact on 
the internal security. In the recent period in the 
Slovak territory there has not been recorded neither 
any immediate terrorist threat nor any involvement 
of persons to a terrorist attack abroad. Regarding to 
the attitudes concerning the foreign countries as 
well as the political ones and the participation of 
the Slovak Armed Forces in the operations of the 
international crisis management there is a risk of 
probable attacks not only against the Slovak 
citizens operating in the crisis regions but also 
against inhabitants and object in the Slovak 
territory.  
Separating the external and internal security 
environment is necessary also from the point of 
view of the methodological research of influences 
leading to changes of both sides of security. 
However, the character of the current and future 
threats wipes away the imaginary frontier between 
their unambiguous affiliations to the external or 
internal dimension of security. One of the decisive 
causes is the globalisation of all areas of the 
society.  
Opening the European space (which is 
desirable) not only in the framework of the EU 
member states but also for the non-members of the 
EU including the third world principally changes 
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the danger of threatening security and puts also its 
internal dimension over the framework of the 
individual countries´ territorial boundaries. As a 
matter of fact the EU from its rise considers the 
issues of the external and internal security as 
common problems of all member states. The 
European Security Strategy defined already in 
December 2003 belongs among the basic 
documents dealing with these issues. It defines as 
the key threats terrorism, proliferation of the 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
failure of the function of the state and organised 
criminal activity. 
One of the latest EU documents in the area of 
security is the proposal of the strategy for the 
internal security submitted by the Council of 
Europe in February 2010. The strategy deals with 
three basic issues: [17] 
 identifying common threats and challenges, 
 defining common policy of the internal 
security and principles  of its 
implementation in the conditions of the 
individual countries, 
 defining the European security model which 
is based on common obligations and tool 
used. 
 
The following main common threats identified 
in the strategy: 
 the terrorism in every form as a significant 
and continuously developing threat of 
security, 
 the serious and organised criminal activity 
as drug trafficking, people trafficking, 
weapons, violent criminal activity, child 
pornography, legalisation of incomes from 
the criminal activity, document 
counterfeiting and other forms,  
 the cyber criminality as a global cross-
border anonymous threat of every 
information system, 
 the cross-border criminal activity of a less 
serious or economic character, however, 
affecting the everyday life of people,  
 the violence among young people connected 
with sport events, 
 the disasters caused by nature as well as 
people, most frequently forest fires, 
earthquakes, floods, storms, droughts, power 
cuts, failures of information and 
communication technologies, etc.  
 the traffic accidents a whole range of other 
common phenomena.    
 
In spite of respecting the common procedures 
concerning the issues of the internal security, the 
security environment of every country has a certain 
specific character. Of course, it does not exclude 
the need to pay attention to all aspects and threats 
of the internal security, however, in an extent 
differentiated according to the real conditions of 
the country.  
The events connected with continuing climatic 
changes which have a potential to hit extensive 
areas of the state, especially floods and storms, 
become more and more frequently serious factors 
that are able to destabilise the economics and affect 
the security environment negatively. Serious 
secondary threats as disruption of infrastructure, 
interruption of supplying with the vital energy, 
etc., are connected with it. The rise of such 
situations can negatively affect also performance 
of individuals and groups of persons in the affected 
territories.  
As the last events connected with reports of the 
physicians show, also the long-term unsolved 
society-wide problems can have a negative 
influence on the security environment in the 
Slovak Republic. The health care belongs to the 
problems affecting the general public. The 
seriousness of the situation is underlined by the 
fact that the Slovak government declared the state 
of emergency (29
th
 November 2011) for ensuring 
the inevitable health care according to the § 5 of 
the constitutional law No. 227/2002 Coll., about 
security of the state during war, state of war, 
martial law or state of emergency.    
Another problem of this type is the so called 
“Roma issue” which has been solved for a long 
time only in a buck-passing way and without any 
conception. If the current approach of the top 
representatives of the Slovak Republic continues 
we can expect a break-out of extensive unrests in 
Slovakia in a time horizon of 10 – 15 years.  
Besides the aforementioned facts the main 
internal threats can be considered as follows: 
 disrupting the infrastructure of the power 
engineering, transport and 
telecommunications, 
 the low law enforcement, 
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 the industrial technical and technological 
threats, 
 deteriorating of the environment quality, 
 the clientelism.  
 
Based on these facts we can say that the global, 
European and Central European security 
environment from the point of view of the Slovak 
Republic shows no signs of a possible direct 
terrorist threat. Currently the economic crisis is the 
most negative factor. It causes economic 
imbalance and has a direct impact also on our 
domestic policy and the deteriorating level of 
employment rate in Slovakia. Other factors as 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, radical nationalism, deliveries of 
crude oil and natural gas, etc. do not pose any 
negative effect on the security environment in 
Slovakia. The internal security environment is 
most affected by the political development, 
unemployment, long-term failing to solve serious 
society-wide problems (health care, Roma issue, 
corruption, etc.), migration of citizens and floods. 
Paradoxically, one of the factors negatively 
affecting the internal security environment is also 
unsuitable legal environment which ambiguously, 
inconsistently or by no means solves the area of 
the critical infrastructure. 
 
5. ENSURING OPERABILITY AND 
PROTECTION OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
The state is a political and power organisation 
whose features are the state territory, citizenship, 
existence of law and order, existence of a relatively 
independently acting subject of international law as 
well as domestic law, political organisation of the 
society comprising the whole society and the 
system of the public power bodies and sovereignty. 
It is an institutional expression of the political 
power and the main body in the society. The state 
is first of all an institutionalised power, i.e. also an 
institution in which this power is embodied.  
Every state fulfils a whole range of functions 
where belong the legal function represented by 
creating and maintaining the legal, political, 
economic and social order, the social, cultural and 
also security function whose task is the protection 
of the nationals, their rights and freedoms against 
internal as well as external threats. These functions 
are achieved through executive, legislative and 
judicial power. The bodies of the state 
administration, the parliament, system of courts, 
armed forces, armed security brigades, emergency 
systems and others are formed for its fulfilment in 
practice.  
The relation of the state and citizen, the state 
and society or also the sate and its legal units is the 
essence of the public administration. The public 
administration as a whole represents an important 
power which organises and secures the fulfilment 
of the socio-economic tasks. The public 
administration through its activities, goals, tools 
and methods ensures the fulfilment of the stated 
social, political and socio-economic interests of the 
state. The objects, methods and goals of the public 
administration are involved in the legal order of the 
state and are concretised in the individual practical 
activities of the public power bodies. The public 
administration and its bodies carry out the 
administration of the state in the public interest. If 
a certain area exceeds the boundaries of the private 
ownership and the interests concern also other 
cooperating subjects in the given society, this area 
becomes public. Those institutions, which realise 
the public administration, carry it out as an activity 
which legally and based on laws must be done as a 
thing of the common interest. The law ensures the 
legal position of the public-law subjects with the 
necessary financial provision.  
Based on the legal authorisation the state 
administration can be carried out by the state 
administration bodies as well as bodies of the local 
self-government or the bodies of the public 
corporations. For performing the state 
administration it is inevitable for a state 
administration body to be armed with powers and 
has to possess the factual and local or personal 
authority in the framework of which it implements 
the scope of authority.  
The state has to ensure the optimal conditions 
for the inhabitants in any situation including the 
crisis situations. The current society gradually with 
the improvement of the technical and technological 
means used for ensuring its everyday needs and the 
extensive implementation of the information and 
communication technologies becomes more and 
more dependent on them. Today we cannot 
imagine our life without regular supplies of 
electrical energy, water, heat, without transport and 
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telecommunication services, the high quality health 
care and enough foodstuffs and other needs of 
everyday use. These basic needs of the inhabitants 
and the life standards are ensured through a widely 
branched infrastructure. The basic links between 
the state, its infrastructure and critical 
infrastructure are shown in the figure 1. 
A quantity of interconnected structural elements 
which maintain the whole structure in the form of 
a functional unit is considered the infrastructure 
(from ten French word infra-structure, literally: 
what is under buildings) in the most general sense 
of the word. This term is used for artificially 
created structures in a whole range of lines of 
business. In the framework of ensuring the 
population we usually use a narrowed term – the 
public infrastructure which contains the transport 
infrastructure, the technical infrastructure of 
buildings, the community facilities as well as 
public places created and utilised in the public 
interest. In the interest of the society it is inevitable 
to administer the public infrastructure, to ensure its 
regular maintenance and development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mankind is thus still more and more 
dependent on the functionality and sufficient 
performance efficiency of the public infrastructure. 
This dependence requires still larger and larger 
resources expended by the state as well as the 
entrepreneurial subjects to achieve the required 
level of security and ensuring uninterrupted 
functionality of the public infrastructure which is a 
risk point in the framework of society’s 
preparedness to resist various crisis phenomena. 
The increased risk is also the extent of linkage and 
mutual dependence of the individual public 
infrastructure elements which is negatively 
affected also by the alteration of the property rights 
from the state to private persons, atomising the 
property relations and the entrance of the foreign 
capital to this area of business. These are the 
reasons why a part of the public infrastructure has 
a cardinal importance for the state performance 
and for ensuring quality life inside of it. This part 
of infrastructure is called the critical infrastructure.  
 
The terminological dictionary of the crisis 
management says that the infrastructure 
particularly includes the objects of special 
importance, other important objects, selected 
information and communication means, premises 
for production and supplying with water, electrical 
energy, crude oil and natural gas and other parts of 
the state property as well as property of the legal 
entities and natural persons determined by the 
Slovak government or other competent bodies of 
the state administration which are inevitable for 
coping with the crisis situations, protection of 
inhabitants and property, for ensuring the minimal 
performance of the state economics as well as its 
external and internal security and which are to be 
particularly protected.     
The area of protecting the critical infrastructure 
became an actual issue of the public interest 
especially due to the threat of the global terrorism. 
Also the EU began to deal with these issues 
intensively. In 2004 the total strategy for protecting 
the critical infrastructure which respected the fact 
that damaging or destroying part of the 
infrastructure in one member state can negatively 
influence other member states and the European 
economics as a whole began to be built. The new 
technologies (e.g. internet) and market 
liberalisation (e.g. for the supplies of power and 
natural gas) cause that a lot of infrastructure types 
Fig. 1 Infrastructure and critical  
infrastructure of the state 
Source: authors 
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is part of a larger network. In these situations the 
protective measures are only as strong as the 
weakest segment is protected. It means that the 
protection level of individual infrastructures, 
sectors and elements should comply with their 
importance from the point of view of the complex 
state security, of ensuring the performance of the 
economy and ensuring the basic needs of the 
inhabitants. 
The European Commission adopted on 20
th
 
October 2004 the material “Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in the Fight against Terrorism” where it 
submitted proposals how to improve the prevention 
against the terrorist attack against the critical 
infrastructure, preparedness and reaction to them 
on the European level. Subsequently, they adopted 
the Green Paper of 17
th
 November 2005 on a 
European programme for critical infrastructure 
protection whose goal was to create a basic 
platform for an effective collaboration of the state 
administrations and operators of the critical 
infrastructure elements. According to the 
conclusions introduced in the Green Paper the 
effective protection of the most important 
infrastructure requires communication, 
coordination and collaboration on the intrastate 
level as well as the EU level among all involved 
subjects – the owners and operators of the 
infrastructure, professional bodies and industrial 
associations in collaboration with all governmental 
levels and the public. In December 2005 the 
Council for Justice and Home Affairs asked the 
Commission to submit the draft of the European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
and parallely it decided in the process of the 
critical infrastructure protection the threats caused 
by people, the technological threats and natural 
disasters will be taken into account, however, the 
priority will be the threat resulting from terrorism. 
In April 2007 the Council then adopted the 
conclusions about the European critical 
infrastructure where it emphasised the final 
responsibility of the member states in the 
framework of their national boundaries for 
managing measures for the critical infrastructure 
protection. In the effort to unify the procedure of 
the individual member states the Council Directive 
2008/114/EC on the identification and designation 
of European critical infrastructures and the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection 
was issued on 8
th
 December 2008. Its content 
brought a principal change in understanding the 
critical infrastructure protection when not the 
protection of people is in the foreground but the 
attention is increasingly paid to the protection of 
infrastructure and services. The Directive 
2008/114/EC stated the date 12
th
 January 2001 for 
the EU member states to adopt measures necessary 
for achieving compliance of fulfilling the tasks 
with this directive and they were to inform the 
Commission about the adopted measures and their 
relation to this directive.  
The Directive 2008/114/EC defines the critical 
infrastructure as follows: „The critical 
infrastructure’ means an asset, system or part 
thereof located in Member States which is essential 
for the maintenance of vital societal functions, 
health, safety, security, economic or social well-
being of people, and the disruption or destruction 
of which would have a significant impact in a 
Member State as a result of the failure to maintain 
those functions.“  (Council Directive, 2008).  
In the Slovak Republic the law about the 
critical infrastructure was adopted on 8
th
 February 
2011. It stated the organisation and scope of 
authority of the state administration in the area of 
the critical infrastructure, the procedure for 
determining the critical infrastructure elements and 
the duties of operators in the area of protecting the 
critical infrastructure elements and responsibility 
for breaching these duties.  
The state administration of the critical 
infrastructure is carried out by the government of 
the Slovak republic and selected central bodies of 
the state administration. The Ministry of Interior of 
the Slovak Republic is authorised to coordinate the 
state administration in the area of the critical 
infrastructure protection carried out by selected 
ministries according to their scope of authority. 
The individual ministries are responsible for the 
following sectors of the critical infrastructure: 
 The Ministry of Economy of the Slovak 
Republic: 
– the sector energy engineering (mining 
industry, power industry, gas industry, 
crude oil and oil products) 
– the sector industry (pharmaceutical 
industry, metallurgy, chemical industry), 
 The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak 
Republic: 
– the sector of the information and 
communication technologies,  
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 The Ministry of Transport, Construction and 
Regional Development of the Slovak 
Republic: 
– the sector transport (road transport, air 
transport, water transport, railroad 
transport), 
– the sector of electronic communication 
(satellite communication, networks and 
services of the fixed and mobile 
electronic communications), 
– the sector post (providing post services, 
payment system by post and procurement 
activity),  
 The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak 
Republic: 
– the sector water and atmosphere 
(meteorological service, water 
constructions, ensuring drinking water), 
 The Ministry of Health of the Slovak 
Republic: 
– the sector of health care.  
 
The diagrammatic depiction of the relations 
between the players of the Slovak critical 
infrastructure – see the figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the state top level the government of the 
Slovak Republic deals with the area of the critical 
infrastructure protection – it is a collective 
executive body. Its tasks are as follows: 
 approving the critical infrastructure 
conception in which it determines the goals, 
priorities and tasks as well as methods for 
their realisation for the corresponding time 
period, 
 approving the critical infrastructure 
programmes between the ministries for 
financial coverage of the tasks resulting 
from the law about the critical infrastructure, 
 determining the criteria for ministries, the 
European sector criteria, the cross-section 
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Figure 2 Determining CI elements in Slovakia 
Source: authors 
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criteria and the European cross-section 
criteria, 
  deciding about determining the element 
and its categorisation to the sector as 
well as discarding the element from the 
sector.  
The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic 
works out in collaboration with other ministries in 
the competence of which the individual critical 
infrastructure sectors are a draft of the critical 
infrastructure concept which it submits for 
approval to the government. Subsequently, in 
collaboration with competent ministries it 
participates in working out the draft of the sector 
criteria, the European sector criteria, the cross-
section criteria and the European cross-section 
criteria. Then the ministry submits it to the 
government with its standpoints.    
The ministry then participates in the process of 
involving the critical infrastructure elements to 
individual sectors as well as in their discarding. 
Also in this area it cooperates with corresponding 
ministries and the decision-making is in the 
government’s competence. As the administrator it 
works out in collaboration with the central bodies 
the draft of the ministry programme of the critical 
infrastructure which is also approved by the 
government.  
Part of information used in the process of the 
critical infrastructure protection has a sensitive 
character. The task of the Ministry of Interior is to 
determine which information is to be involved to 
this category and to state responsible persons who 
can obtain this information. In this connection the 
ministry administers the non-public central register 
of the elements in the electronic form. The non-
public register contains data about ranking the 
individual elements to the corresponding sectors 
and their detailed description including the 
statutory representative. Compared to majority of 
the neighbouring states Slovakia keeps part of 
critical infrastructure data secret which seems 
nowadays as a non-systemic measure.  
The ministry also checks in collaboration with 
the corresponding central body the fulfilment of 
the duties for operators of the individual elements 
of the European critical infrastructure. In the 
framework of these tasks it coordinates the matters 
concerning the protection of the European critical 
infrastructure element with the corresponding 
member state and the European Commission and 
takes part in negotiations about these issues. It 
informs the Commission about the issues 
connected with the protection of the European 
critical infrastructure elements, about the number 
of the European critical infrastructure elements 
according to the sectors and about the number of 
the involved member states. Once or twice a year it 
submits a report to the Commission concerning 
risks, threats and vulnerable points in the sectors 
where the European critical infrastructure elements 
are. It also informs the corresponding state about 
discarding the elements of the European critical 
infrastructure from the sector and the reason for 
discarding. In the framework of its scope of 
authority it collaborates with the same institution 
abroad. 
The individual ministries which take care about 
the corresponding critical infrastructure sectors 
work out a draft for the sector criteria and 
European sector criteria which is then submitted to 
the Ministry of Interior. In compliance with them 
and according to the procedure stated by the law 
they prepare a draft for determining the element 
and its ranking to the sector as well as the proposal 
for discarding the element from the sector. They 
collaborate with the operators who are informed 
about the decisions for determining the element 
and ranking the element to the sector as well as 
about discarding. These facts are continuously 
assessed. They work out the analysis of the sector 
risks and its updating which is submitted to the 
Ministry of Interior and in writing it gives opinion 
to the security plan and its updating.  
Similarly, as the Ministry of Interior also the 
individual ministries which are responsible for the 
individual sectors of the critical infrastructure 
determine in collaboration with the operators the 
extent of the sensitive information and protect it 
according to the stated principles. They ensure the 
inspection activity in relation to the operator and 
submit to the Ministry of Interior a summary report 
dealing with the inspection of the operators. They 
solve breaching of law and the stated principles 
with the operators and in the extent of their scope 
of authority they can collaborate with a similar 
institution abroad.  
The public power represents a force in the state 
which is able to ensure the formation, fastening 
and protection of the individual sectors and 
elements of the critical infrastructure through legal 
means including the forcible compulsion means. 
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Without the public power it would not be possible 
to ensure the required standard of living of the 
citizens and the social relations as well. Just the 
ability to ensure the order also by compulsion is 
one of the most important features of the social 
relation. The essence of the crisis management of 
the state, whose part is also the process of ensuring 
the protection and operability of the critical 
infrastructure, is based on a special mechanism of 
public power performance which consists of: 
 implementing specific means for the 
public power performance, 
 the specific institutional security 
provision of the state (security system of 
Slovakia).  
 
The special tools of the crisis management are 
the certain authorisations of the state bodies and 
other subjects which consist in the possibility or 
duty to accept and carry out crisis measures aimed 
at solving the crisis situations with emphasis on the 
protection of people and property, i.e. minimising 
the damages and quick return to the situation 
before the crisis. Their part is also the restriction of 
the property rights and affecting the activity of the 
critical infrastructure operators.  
A system of public power bodies and other 
elements of the crisis management which represent 
the security system of the Slovak Republic and are 
responsible for prevention of the rise of the crisis 
phenomena, for crisis planning and permanent 
preparedness for solving the arisen crises creates 
the specific institutional provision of the state. 
Also individual ministries which control the 
corresponding sectors of the critical infrastructure, 
the Ministry of Interior as the coordinator of the 
process of the critical infrastructure protection and 
the government which plays the decisive role in the 
area of the crisis preparedness fulfil concrete tasks 
connected with the critical infrastructure protection 
in the framework of the security system.     
Providing the protection and functionality of 
the critical infrastructure and its elements is not 
only a task of the state and corresponding 
institutions of the public administration but also of 
the operators. The operator of a critical 
infrastructure element can be a company 
established in the scope of authority of the state or 
it can be a private company with participation of 
the domestic or foreign capital. The relation 
between the central body of the state 
administration and operator distinguishes also in 
connection to these property relations in the given 
element. The problem in this area is the fact that in 
the substantial proportion of the privatisation 
contracts there is anchored no duty to fulfil 
concrete tasks in the area of the crisis management.  
In compliance with some measures of the 
economic mobilisation where belong (according to 
the law No. 179/2011 Coll., about economic 
mobilisation) e.g. organising the production and 
services, regulating the distribution and 
consumption of electricity and heat and the 
regulation of distribution and consumption of the 
natural gas, organising the supplies of vitally 
important products or vitally important goods, 
organising the health care, organising the transport, 
solving the lack of crude oil, organising the post 
services, the organisation of providing the 
electronic communication networks and electronic 
communication services would seem advantageous 
if the operators of the critical infrastructure 
elements were at the same time the subjects of 
economic mobilisation. However, this problem has 
not been solved in the corresponding legal 
standards.    
 
A substantial part of the rights which the 
subjects of the economic mobilisation possess 
could reflect in increasing the protection level and 
functionality of the critical infrastructure elements. 
Here belongs e.g. the right (in writing) to ask the 
corresponding district office to release its 
employees from the working duties, to require 
from the district office to provide human resources 
and material means for fulfilling a concrete 
measure and a whole range of others.     
The operators of the individual critical 
infrastructure elements are obliged to protect them 
against disruption or destruction. Due to fulfilling 
this task the operator has to assess the risks which 
threaten the security and functionality of the 
operated critical infrastructure element in a 
complex way and subsequently to work out a 
security plan which contains scenarios of the 
possible disruption of functionality or destruction 
of the assessed element and security measures 
adopted for its protection. They contain an 
integrated system based on mechanical preventive 
means, technical preventive means, security 
elements of the information systems as well as the 
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physical protection, inspection measures and their 
combination.  
The critical infrastructure element operators 
have to discuss the worked out security plan with 
the corresponding central body of the state 
administration within six months from receiving 
the information about determining the element and 
its involvement to the sector and to implement it to 
practice. In the framework of implementing the 
security plan into practice the operators are obliged 
to inform their employees in an inevitable content 
with the security plan and minimally once per three 
years to train (on a model situation) the measures 
realised in the case of a threat which can cause 
disruption or destruction of the element.  
In the process of updating the technological 
processes and building new systems of the 
property protection the operator is obliged to take 
into account also the character of the possible 
threat of the critical infrastructure element and the 
change in the security environment. Therefore the 
security plan is to be continuously assessed and the 
potential changes to discuss with the corresponding 
central state administration body. Subsequently the 
updated security plan can be introduced to practice.  
The collaboration between the central state 
administration body and the operator of the critical 
infrastructure element is realised through a 
determined authorised person who is at the same 
time also the contact person if it is an element of 
the European critical infrastructure. The authorised 
person provides the corresponding central state 
administration body with cooperation in the issues 
connected with ranking the element to the 
corresponding critical infrastructure sector, with 
working out an analysis of the sector risks and the 
administration of the element register. The 
operators are furthermore obliged to inform 
immediately the corresponding central body about 
the changes in the area of their activity which can 
affect the determination of the element and its 
ranking to the sector, the sale of the element or 
another change of the property and legal relation to 
the element, the start of liquidation, the declaration 
of solvency or the permission for restructuring.  
The operators have the right to receive the 
financial contribution for fulfilling the duties 
connected with carrying out the security measures 
for protecting the element if they were ordered to 
them by the corresponding central state 
administration body in the area of the critical 
infrastructure and at the same time they do not 
follow from the valid legal regulations. 
 
6. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES 
In spite of the fact that the intensive and 
targeted attention to the critical infrastructure has 
been paid only for a relatively short time period of 
ten years, we can already follow certain trends and 
generalise the acquired information. The growing 
effects of the natural disasters in Central Europe 
represented especially by floods and partially 
higher speeds of the wind (windstorms, hurricanes) 
are one of it. The consequences of disrupting the 
infrastructure in these cases exceed the regional as 
well as national boundaries.  Undoubtedly the 
sector of the information and communication 
technologies both from the point of view of failing 
people during utilisation of the information 
technique or erroneous software and targeted 
attacks of the hackers is a growing risk. In the 
future we must not underestimate the health risks 
connected with epidemics and pandemics. The 
mass diseases and quarantines can make the 
attendance of the object or equipment of the 
critical infrastructure non-functional and cause the 
subsequent chain reaction in other dependent 
sectors. 
This mutual functional linkage of almost all 
critical infrastructure sectors it although a 
generally famous phenomenon but its extent and 
impact become apparent often only when a failure 
and infrastructure drop out occur. A lot of material, 
logical as well as virtual links, as a matter of fact, 
are not visible during failure-free operation of the 
infrastructure. However, it can be a very high level 
of dependence whose consequence is, as a rule, an 
undesirable domino effect. Its initiator can be even 
a tiny stimulus which seems to be harmless 
fromthe local point of view.  
The goal of the critical infrastructure protection 
is to reduce and minimise the duration of the 
breakdown in dependence on the probability of the 
rise of failures or elimination of its elements on the 
national level. The critical infrastructure protection 
has to be ensured on one hand by concrete 
protection measures and on the other hand by 
collaboration of a quantity of elements which deal 
with the individual protection aspects.  
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Working out the conception of the critical 
infrastructure protection is a cyclically repeating 
process. It is based on the assessment of the 
existing competences and legal documents which 
state the goals of protection. A deeper analysis of 
threats and risks follows. Based on this analysis we 
assess up to what level the current measures ensure 
the required goals. If they are not sufficient, 
additional measures are added. Their adoption or 
adaptation is first of all a political issue. The result 
can be new tools for protecting the critical 
infrastructure. The practical implementation of the 
tools will test the level of the achievement of the 
goals for protection and a potential need of further 
changes.  
The principles of the critical infrastructure 
protection can be formulated in several points (29):  
 The integrated risk management – the 
programme of the critical infrastructure 
protection is based on a thorough assessment 
of the risks from which the measures in the 
area of the prevention (e.g. construction and 
technical planning, emergency planning), of 
the usage (e.g. physical protection, alarm 
systems, crisis communication), of the 
repairs (e.g. temporary repair of 
infrastructure) and of the recovery (e.g. 
reconstruction of infrastructure) are derived, 
 The full spectrum of the risks – as a matter 
of fact, the risk assessment has to deal with 
all relevant risks (natural, technical, social) 
without preferring any of them, 
 The resistance and flexibility are of great 
importance as the whole infrastructure is not 
uninterruptedly protected and is vulnerable. 
Therefore after disruption the return to the 
original state has to be as fast as possible. 
The infrastructure resistance is created by its 
robustness, availability of reserves, the 
capability and speed of realising supporting 
measures, the ability of the society to solve 
the crisis situations, 
 Maintaining the proportionality – the 
adopted measures have to be proportional to 
the extent of the risk and required goals of 
protection therefore adequacy between the 
costs, protection, security as well as 
independence and legal rights has to be 
preserved (it must not cause the market 
deformation), 
 The subsidiarity – the measures have to 
penalise the critical infrastructure operators 
as well as the public sector. Due to the fact 
that a big part of the critical infrastructure 
belongs to the private sector, special 
responsibility for measures and investments 
arises. Protecting its own elements of the 
critical infrastructure and support of 
operators is required from the public sector. 
 
The prospects of the suggested and realised 
critical infrastructure protection measures are 
dependent on several factors. In the coming period 
also the following problems are to be solved here 
(30): 
 The central problem is the mutual 
dependence and complexity of the critical 
infrastructure sectors. A possible 
contradictory moment inside of the sector 
can be the different level of the individual 
elements and sub-systems (e.g. the modern 
management system and obsolete physical 
management objects. The link between the 
sectors in the case of a drop-out of one 
sector causes the already mentioned cascade 
of failures of the dependent sectors; 
however, the size of the contact element 
between the sectors is not important at all.  
 The internationalisation and coordinated 
collaboration is an objective consequence of 
the international market integration and 
unification of the technical standards. 
Especially the network sectors (transport, 
energy engineering) have to be regulated 
together. This regulation is necessary also 
from the point of view of various ownership 
of the critical infrastructure. It is to say that 
the measures for protecting the critical 
infrastructure serve – often in a greater 
extent – in favour of the neighbouring states,  
 The long-term planning and maintenance of 
property is connected with usage and big 
financial demandingness of the critical 
infrastructure. Therefore the private 
operators insist on knowing the strategic 
development trends. A big challenge is not 
only to build a new infrastructure but also to 
ensure the maintenance and operation of the 
existing capacities.  
 The variedness of the risks and new 
conceptions of protection require a 
permanent risk analysis. However, the great 
extent of risks almost excludes in practice 
their full elimination by every critical 
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infrastructure operator. Therefore there is a 
requirement for implementing the flexible 
protection conceptions which take into 
account all risk sources and solve them by 
improving the technical and social systems. 
The goal of this flexible conception is to 
reduce the consequences of a crisis 
phenomenon as well as fast recovery of the 
standard operation.  
 
The common approaches and coordination of 
measures in the area of the critical infrastructure of 
the EU countries belong to the basic collaboration 
areas of the member states. Besides the 
inevitability to fulfil the adopted documents the 
real network connection of the decisive 
infrastructure sectors – energy engineering, 
transport and communication systems – is an 
objective need of collaboration. In spite of the 
partially different conditions of the individual 
states the achieved level of identification and 
protection of infrastructure is on a comparable 
level and this is valid in the case of immediately 
neighbouring countries.  
One of the possible indicators is the comparison 
of the defined critical infrastructure sectors shown 
in the table 1. Beside Slovakia (SK) the table 
shows the countries with common boundaries, 
i.e. the Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Hungary (H) and Austria (A) and for comparison Germany (D). 
 
Table 1 Comparing the critical infrastructure sectors in selected countries 
Critical Infrastructure Sector 
Country 
S
K 
C
Z 
P
L 
H A D 
Transport X X X X X X 
Electronic communications X      
Energy Engineering X X X  X X 
Information and Communication Technologies X X X X X X 
Post (Telecommunications) X  X    
Industry X   X   
Water and Atmosphere X X X X X X 
Health Care X X X X X X 
Food Industry and Agriculture   X X X X X 
Financial Market and Currency   X X X X X 
Emergency Services  X X    
Public Transport  X X X  X 
Production, warehousing and usage of chemicals and ra-
dioactive substances (including pipeline transportation  
of hazardous substances) 
  X  X  
Police and Defence     X X  
Research     X  
Media and culture       X 
Total of Sectors 8 9 11 9 10 9 
Sources: [22], [24], [25],[26],[27],[28] 
In the Czech Republic the coordinator of the 
tasks in the area of the critical infrastructure is the 
Committee for Civilian Emergency Planning as a 
working body of the Security Council of the state. 
The National Programme of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection is linked with the Complex Strategy to 
Solving Critical Infrastructure and is created 
parallely with this document. The law No. 
430/2010 Coll., which amends the law No. 
240/2000 Coll., about crisis management and other 
laws (crisis law) as amended became effective on 
1
st
 January 2011. The subject matter of the 
amendment of the crisis law is also to state the 
scope of authority and powers of the state bodies 
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and bodies of the territorial self-government units 
and the rights and duties of the legal entities and 
natural persons in the critical infrastructure 
protection. It incorporates the critical infrastructure 
protection to the crisis management and states all 
crisis management bodies (government, the 
Ministries of Interior, of Transport, of Industry and 
Trade, the Czech National Bank, the district bodies 
and other bodies in the area of the districts, the 
municipality bodies with extended scope of 
authority, legal entities and natural persons, 
subjects of the critical infrastructure) the tasks in 
relation to the critical infrastructure. It defines all 
basic terms – the critical infrastructure, the 
European critical infrastructure,, the element, the 
subject and critical infrastructure protection, the 
cross-sectional and branch criteria for determining 
the critical infrastructure elements. The Resolution 
of the Government No. 432/2010 Coll., about 
criteria for determining the element of the critical 
infrastructure concretises the cross-sectional and 
branch criteria for determining the critical 
infrastructure elements in all nine areas of the 
critical infrastructure.  
In Poland the responsibility for the critical in-
frastructure is delegated to the government body 
Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa. The main leg-
islative document is the law about the crisis man-
agement from 2007 which is gradually amended. 
In 2010 the issues concerning the critical infra-
structure were incorporated to the law. It defines 
the European critical infrastructure, critical infra-
structure and its systems and the critical infrastruc-
ture protection. The preparation of solution in the 
case of disrupting the critical infrastructure is part 
of the tasks in the area of civilian planning. The 
law obliges the duty to work out the nationwide 
crisis management plan and the same plans on the 
level of the region, district and municipality. These 
plans also include the characteristic of threats and 
risks in relation to the critical infrastructure, the 
procedures for solving tasks connected with the 
protection of the critical infrastructure and the 
tasks in the area of protection and recovery of the 
critical infrastructure. The law furthermore states 
the adoption of the national programme of the crit-
ical infrastructure protection. There are concretised 
duties for the heads of the regions, the mayor and 
the head of the municipality councils who are to 
organise the fulfilment of tasks in the area of the 
critical infrastructure protection. The structure, 
processing and updating the plans for the critical 
infrastructure protection is stated by the decision of 
the Council of Ministers from 30
th
 April 2010. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The task of every state is to ensure the required 
level of the external as well as internal security. 
This task is fulfilled by a whole range of the 
specific measures of the state administration which 
creates the security system of the state and 
participates in realising the measures ensuring a 
continuous increase of the inhabitants´´ standard of 
living. The infrastructure of the country creates 
conditions for fulfilling the needs for life of the 
citizens and improves the life comfort. The 
disruption of the transport systems, interruption of 
energy supplies or supplies of food and water can 
be caused by the natural but also anthropogeneous 
factors. Due to them especially in the towns there 
can arise serious crisis situations which the state 
has to solve effectively and as quickly as possible. 
The European Union has been emphasising 
especially during the last decade the necessity to 
select and secure that part of the infrastructure 
which is the most important for the state as well as 
the citizens. The Slovak Republic began to deal 
with the area of the critical infrastructure only 
during recent years and for the time being it has a 
whole range of unsolved problems which affect the 
method and quality of ensuring the critical 
infrastructure operability. Solving these issues in 
the nearest future is the task of the state 
administration as well as the scientific and research 
institutions. The Faculty of Special Engineering 
would like to participate actively in fulfilling these 
tasks. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INFORMATION 
SOURCES  
 
[1] BECKER, H.S. 1996. The Epistemology of 
Qualitativeresearch. In: JESSOR, Richard, 
COLBY, Anne, SCHWEDER, Richard (eds.). 
Ethnography and Human Development. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, s. 29-37. ISBN 0-
226-39902-8 
[2] BORRADORI, G. 2005. Filosofie v době 
teroru. Karolinum, Praha 2005. 188 s. ISBN 
80-246-0907-X 
[3] BUZAN, B., WAEVER, O., DE WILDE, J. 
2005. Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu. 
Logistics and Transport No 1(14)/2012  Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
 101 
Brno: Centrum strategických studií. ISBN 80-
903333-6-2 
[4] FRANK, L.: Bezpečnostní prostředí České 
republiky [on-line]. [cit.24.11.2011]. 
Dostupné na: 
http://www.mocr.army.cz/mo/obrana_a_strate
gie/1-2003cz/frank.pdf 
[5] LAML, R.: 2008. Niekoľko poznámok 
k definícií bezpečnostného prostredia 
v Bezpečnostnej stratégií SR. Fórum pre me-
dzinárodnú politiku. Mepoforum.sk 
[6] LASICOVÁ, J. 2006. Bezpečnosť: Bez-
pečnostná agenda súčasnosti. Univerzita Ma-
teja Bela v Banskej Bystrici, Fakulta poli-
tických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov. 
ISBN 80-8083-352-4. 
[7] PROCHÁZKOVÁ, D.: Bezpečnost je základní 
prioritou současnosti [on-line]. 
[cit.24.11.2011]. Dostupné na: 
[8] http://www.cemc.cz/aspekty/vyber_z_clanku/r
izeni/dokumenty/11.pdf 
[9] PROCHÁZKOVÁ, D.: Komplexní pohled na 
problematiku bezpečnosti [on-line]. 
[cit.23.8.2011]. Dostupné na:  
[10] http://aplikace.mvcr.cz/archiv2008/2003/caso
pisy/vs/0435/konz_info.html 
[11] ŠIMÁK, L. 2006: Manažment rizík. Žilina 
2006. 116 s. ISBN 80-88829-13-5 
[12] ŠIMÁK, L., HORÁČEK, J., NOVÁK,L., 
NÉMETH, Ľ., MÍKA, V. 2005.: Terminolo-
gický slovník krízového riadenia, ŽILINA 
2005, ISBN 80-88829-75-5 
[13] ŠKVRNDA, F., PAWERA, R., WEISS, P. 
2008. Medzinárodná bezpečnosť. Bratislava: 
Vydavateľstvo EKONÓM. ISBN 978-80-225-
2527-5 
[14] ZEMAN, P: Česká bezpečnostní terminologie. 
1. vyd. Brno : Vojenská akademie v Brně - 
Ústav strategických studií, 2003 
[15] Bezpečná Evropa v lepším světě – Evropská 
bezpečnostní strategie [on-line]. 
[cit.24.11.2011]. Dostupné na: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
031208ESSIICS.pdf 
[16] ČSN EN 31010 Managementrizik – Techniky 
posuzovánírizik, UNMZ, Praha, 2011, 80s. 
[17] Koncepcia kritickej infraštruktúry v 
Slovenskej republike a spôsob jej ochrany a 
obrany (2006). [on-line]. 19 s. Dostupné na: 
http://www.minv.sk/?ochrana-kritickej-
infrastruktury 
[18] Národný program pre ochranu a obranu kri-
tickej infraštruktúry v Slovenskej republike 
(2007). [on-line]. 24 s. Dostupné na: 
http://www.minv.sk/?ochrana-kritickej-
infrastruktury 
[19] Návrh stratégie vnútornej bezpečnosti EÚ: 
„Smerom k európskemu bezpečnostnému mo-
delu“, Brusel, 2010 
[20] Risiken und Herausforderungen für die öffent-
liche Sicherheit in Deutschlad, Berlín, 2008, 
ISBN 978-3-934401-18-1 
[21] Smernica rady 2008/114/ES, z 8.12.2008 
o identifikácií a označení európských kri-
tických infraštruktúr a zhodnotení potreby 
zlepšiť ich ochranu. In: úradný vestník Eu-
rópskej únie, L345/75-82 
[22] Správa o vykonávaní Európskej bezpečnostnej 
stratégie – Zaistenie bezpečnosti v meniacom 
sa svete, Luxemburg, 2009, ISBN 978-92-
824-2432-2 
[23] STN ISO 31000 Manažérstvo rizika Zásady 
a návod, SUTN, Bratislava, 2011, 40s. 
[24] Zákon NR SR číslo 45/2011 z 8. februára 
o  kritickej infraštruktúre 
[25] Zelená kniha, 2005 o európskom programe na 
ochranu najdôležitejšej infraštruktúry 
[26] Nariadenie vlády ČR o kritériách pre určenie 
prvku kritickej infraštruktúry č.432/2010 Sb. 
[27] Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym z dn. 
26.04. 2007 r., Dziennikustaw z 2007 r., Nr 
89, poz. 590, z 2009 r. Nr 11, poz. 59, Nr 65, 
poz. 553, Nr 85, poz. 716, Nr 131, poz. 076, 
z 2010 r. Nr 240, poz. 1600 
[28] Határozatok Tára 2008. évi 31. szám. Kritikus 
Infrastruktúra Védelem Nemzeti Programjáról 
[29]  K.: . In: Der Soldat, Wien,  
[30] Nationale Strategie zum Schutz Kritischer Inf-
rastrukturen (KRITIS-Strategie), Berlin, BMI, 
2009, 20 s., Artikelnummer: BMI09324 
[31] Grundstrategie des Bundesrates zum Schutz 
Kritischer Infrastrukturen, Bern, BABS, 2009, 
dostupné na: 
[32] http://www.bevoelkerungsschutz.admin.ch 
[33] Der Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen: Gegen-
wart und Zukunft, CRN Report, Zürich, CSS 
ETH, 2010, 23 s. 
[34] This work was supported by the Slovak Re-
search and Development Agency under the 
contract No.APVV-041-10. 
 
 
Miloslav Seidl, Ladislav Šimák 
Faculty of Special Engineering of the 
University of Žilina, Slovak Republic 
Miloslav.Seidl@fsi.utc.sk 
ladislav.simak@fsi.uniza.sk 
 Protection of Critical Infrastructure  Logistics and Transport No 1(14)/2012 
 
 102 
 
